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Introduction
A quantitative methodology is being developed at JPL for assessment of risk of failure of
solid rocket motors. This probabilistic methodology employs best available engineering
models and available information in a stochastic framework. The framework accounts for
incomplete knowledge of governing parameters, intrinsic variability, and failure model
specification error. Earlier case studies have been conducted on several failure modes of
the Space Shuttle Main Engine (refs. 1,2,3). This paper describes work in progress on
application of this probabilistic approach to large solid rocket boosters such as the
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor for the Space Shuttle. Failure due to debonding has been
selected as the first case study for large solid rocket motors (SRMs) since it accounts for a
significant number of historical SRM failures. Impact of incomplete knowledge of
governing parameters and failure model specification errors is expected to be important.
Debond Failure in SRMs.
SRM failure modes generally fall into the categories of debonding, nozzle failure,
propellant cracking, combustion instability, field joint failure, O-ring failure, and case
burst. As an initial case study, this work is focussing on failure due to debonding.
Motivation for looking at debond failure is clear, as stated in reference 4:
It is probably a conservative estimate that well over half of all mishaps (and this
includes the latest space shuttle disaster) are due to the flame front prematurely
reaching the chamber walls, or getting into places where it should not. Usually
the cause is a failure of the propellant-liner bond, or the propellant-to-insulation
bond, and sometimes insulation to chamber wall bond.
The problem of solid propellant debonding has received considerable attention in the
literature. For example, in reference 5, a finite element computer code was developed for
evaluation of the state of stress in solid propellant case liner bond regions. Also, a closed
form fracture mechanics solution which accounts for the dissimilar material properties on
either side of the bondline was proposed for predicting debond growth. Reference 6
discussed both stress-strain and fracture mechanics techniques for predicting bondline
failures.
The underlying chemistry and environment of the bond region are quite complex. These
issues are addressed in references 7 and 8. However it may not be necessary to incorporate
all of the complexity considered in these references in order to satisfactorily assess
reliability. Inherent variability of various parameters in the bonded region may be
accounted for through the statistical approach described briefly below, and in detail in
reference 1.
The Debond Failure Mode. The sequence of events leading to failure by debonding is
shown in Figure 1. Failure due to debonding begins as a defect, or crack, in the bond
region, referred to as the "Initial State" in Figure 1. This defect may occur as a result of
normal manufacturing processes, or perhaps as a result of foreign particle inclusion. In
general there will be a distribution of size and locations of a number of defects. These
defects may grow prior to launch as a result of induced bondline stresses from shipping
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andhandlingloads,thermal cycling, and moisture absorption. Additional defect growth
may result from vibrations during launch, axial acceleration, case pressurization,
aerodynamic heating, or vibrational loads. The result can be a defect of a certain size and
location such that the flame front can enter the defect region. The debonded region
contributes additional surface area for burning. This can lead to uneven burn and increased
pressure. If the pressure becomes higher than the design pressure, it can cause mechanical
deformation and further defect growth. Case burn-through becomes a possibility, and
detonation can result if the pressure rise is rapid enough (ref. 9).
The Probabilistic Failure Assgssment (PFA) Meth0dologv.
The PFA Methodology developed at JPL is a quantitative technique for estimating reliability
warranted by the available information. (See reference 1 for a detailed description of PFA.)
For cases of unacceptable risk, PFA identifies areas where design improvement and/or
additional data are required.
The core of the PFA approach consists of analytical engineering models which characterize
failure phenomena in terms of governing parameters. Such failure models typically express
a failure parameter such as burst pressure, flaw size, or flaw growth rate, as a function of
"drivers." These drivers, i.e., the governing parameters, determine the value of the failure
parameter. The drivers usually include geometry and dimensions, loads and environmental
conditions, and relevant material properties for the operating environment.
In this probabilistic approach, the drivers are characterized by probability distributions
These probability distributions express uncertainty regarding driver values within the
ranges of possible values. The accuracy of the failure model is treated as another driver
which is probabilistically characterized. The probability distributions for the drivers are
derived from available information regarding uncertainty of their values. The drivers are
characterized using the information that exists at the time of the analysis. There is no
specific information requirement for any driver.
The driver distributions reflect incomplete knowledge and limited information regarding
driver values as well as intrinsic variability. The criteria of not overstating the available
information in the driver probability distributions must be observed in order to
appropriately represent the risk that results from incomplete knowledge and limited
information.
Performance, weight, and cost requirements that propulsion systems must meet may not
permit consistently, verifiably conservative values for analysis parameters to be used in all
cases. Deterministic analyses for such applications must be "calibrated" by means of
directly relevant past experience with applications that are similar in terms of the knowledge
of input parameters, the validity of engineering models under the conditions of an
application, and variability of manufacturing processes.
When deterministic analyses are used in applications that are removed from the directly
relevant experience base, as is often the case for launch vehicle propulsion systems, the
uncertainty or risk associated with their results increases. Since a deterministic analysis
provides no quantitative risk estimate, an assessment of risk incurred as a result of having
chosen any specific set of values for the governing parameters of the analysis must be left
to the vicissitudes of judgment formed in the absence of directly relevant experience.
Deterministic analyses of failure modes under such conditions of limited information thus
becomes arbitrary. Launch vehicle propulsion systems are invariably subject to some
number of failure modes for which the governing parameters may not be well known, e.g.,
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theknowledgeof loadsand/orlocalenvironmentsmaybesignificantlyuncertainandthe
validityof analyticalmodelsusedto characterizefailurephenomenamaybequestionable.
Undersuchconditionsof limited informationanduncertainanalyses,theimplicit
considerationof risk bymeansof qualitativejudgmentsbasedondeterministicanalysisof
failuremodesis inadequate.
In contrast,thePFAMethodologyquantitativelyaccountsfor driver specificationerror
throughappropriateformulationof thedriverprobabilitydistribution.Applicationof a
MonteCarlotechniqueusingthedriverdistributions,coupledwith theengineeringmodel,
producesa setof simulatedfailures.Thesesimulatedfailuresarethenfit to aparametric
failuredistributionwhich is treatedasaBayesianpriordistribution.This priordistribution
is thenmodifiedusingBayesianupdatingto incorporatetestandflight experience.The
resultis aposteriorprobabilitydistributionfor thefailuremode.Overallmissionriskcan
beestimatedbyaggregationof criticalfailuremoderesults.
Theresultantrisk maybejudgedto beacceptableor unacceptable.If risk is unacceptable,
theframeworkof thePFAanalysisfacilitatestheprocedurefor choosingactionswhichwill
reducetherisk. Theeffecton risk, for example,of acquiringadditionaldata,improving
theengineeringmodel,or makingdesignchanges,canbedetermineddirectly and
quantitatively.
Application of PFA Methodology to DebQnding.
At this writing, a flowchart for the engineering model for debonding has been developed.
The model, shown in Figure 2, incorporates the processes described in the debond failure
mode description above. Standard nomenclature is used: KI and KII are the mode I and
mode II stress intensity factors, respectively. It is expected that some parts of the flowchart
will require more detail while other parts represent unnecessary detail, and will be revised.
For example, finite element and finite difference calculations are incorporated in the
flowchart loop. These would be extremely demanding of computational time if they were
required to be within the Monte Carlo analysis. Considerations of this type have been
encountered before (refs. 2 & 3), and some techniques have been found which help
minimize cpu time. Modifications of the Monte Carlo approach and alternative methods
will also be considered.
It is important to reiterate that the risk assessment will be made using available information-
-no additional program to develop data is required (although advantage will be taken of
such opportunities, in particular appropriate information from the Solid Propellant Integrity
Program, ref. 10, will be utilized). For example, variability or scarcity of data in material
properties can be accounted for statistically. If the resultant risk is unacceptable, the
structure of the PFA methodology can suggest options which will have the greatest impact
on the risk estimate. Possible options include design or processing changes, improved
inspection capability, acquisition of additional materials characterization data, and reduction
in uncertainty of engineering models.
Interaction with experts in the SRM industry have been and will continue to play an
important role in technical development of this program.
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DEBOND FAILURE PROCESSES
INITIAL STATE
SHIPPING & HANDLING LOADS
• related to inspection capability
• spatial and size distribution of defects
• size/geometTy of grain
• matedal propertes
variability: spatial, sample-to-sample
• "stress-relieving" insu/alion
• thermal environment
• frequency, amplitude, direction of loads
LAUNCH LOAD ENVIRONMENT
prior to combustion in defect
• frequency, amplitude, direction of loads
• single/dual grain
COMBUSTION LOADING
FAILURE: E.G.,
NO FAILURE CASE BURST OR
BURN-THROUGH
• chamber pressure
• (erosive) burn rate
• grain geometry
• crack geometry
• dual grain
• case geometry
• case material properties
• pressure and temperature in crack
Figure 1. Diagram of debonding processes. Comments to the right of the boxes represent
a partial list of relevant factors.
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I Initial State 1
• Location and size of debond
defects
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• Residual thermal stresses
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n crack. (Finite-differerme implicit |
olution.) J
"Flow continues into 1 f Flow may proceed out of
temperature ino'ease I llempera|ure change; crack I
-> crack loading l I loading changes; /
/crack geometry changes /
changes. J L due t° buming" J
! !
__ No _Yes
Yes
No Failure 1 Failure: 1
•crack growth rate large
-crack growth rate > bum rate
•crack size large
•K I or ,> K cr for u_stable
growth
Figure 2. Flowchart of PFA debond model.
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